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1. Introduction 
Foreign acquisitions of Australian firms, particularly in the resources sector, are often 
contentious and attract substantial political and media debate.  For example, in February 2009 
there was significant media and political attention on the proposed investment by Aluminium 
Corporation of China (Chinalco) in the resource projects of Rio Tinto Limited.  Commenting 
on the proposed investment Senator Nick Xenophon stated: "This deal is not in the national 
interest. You sell the milk, not the cow, and we should be selling the minerals and not the 
mine."
1
  Similarly, the decision of the Federal Treasurer to block China Nonferrous Metal 
Mining Group from obtaining a controlling interest in Lynas Corporation created widespread 
discussion.
2
  Despite the significant attention that this topic attracts at present there is no 
empirical evidence examining takeovers offers for Australian listed firms by overseas 
entities.  This study aims to address this void in the literature by examining if the 
characteristics of target firms subject to a foreign takeover are different to those subject to a 
takeover from an Australian firm.  Secondly, this paper determines whether similar to studies 
in the US (e.g., Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991) shareholders in Australian target firms accrue 
higher wealth gains when a foreign bidder makes a takeover offer. 
 
Previous research suggests that foreign acquirers will make a cross-border takeover to obtain 
access to technology (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991) and will make bids for relatively larger 
targets due to the greater search costs of making an overseas acquisition (Chen and Su, 1997).  
It is also suggested that that domestic firms will be more likely to receive a foreign takeover 
in periods of domestic currency weakness (Froot and Stein, 1991).  Supporting the results in 
                                                 
1
 See “Nick Xenophon hits out at Rio Tinto sale” available at http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/mr-x-hits-
out-at-rio-tinto-sale/story-e6freo8c-1225710562261.  Created on May 9, 2009. 
2
 See for example the media article by Marriner (2009). 
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Chen and Su (1997) this study documents that target firms subject to a foreign takeover are 
relatively larger in size.  Inconsistent with expectations however, we find that Australian 
target firms that receive a foreign bid are no more research intensive than target firms that 
attract a takeover from an Australian firm.  The level of the Australian dollar exchange rate is 
insignificant in explaining the likelihood of a foreign takeover bid.  The results also indicate 
that targets of foreign bidders have significantly lower leverage and are significantly more 
likely to be operating in the resources sector. 
 
Consistent with evidence from the US (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Shaked, Michel and 
McClain, 1991 and Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos, 1992) we document that target 
shareholders receive significantly higher abnormal returns in takeovers announced by foreign 
bidders.  As this result indicates that foreign firms are willing to pay more for Australian 
targets than their domestic counterparts it at least partially addresses the political concern 
over allowing foreigners to purchase domestic assets.  The results also show that target firm 
abnormal return in takeovers from overseas bidders are positively associated with target firm 
research and development (R&D) intensity consistent with the US findings in Harris and 
Ravenscraft (1991).   The Australian dollar exchange rate is unrelated to target shareholder 
wealth gains in foreign takeovers. 
 
The remainder of this study is arranged as follows.  Section 2 discusses prior literature 
relevant to this study and describes the regulatory framework for foreign takeovers of 
Australian companies.  The research method is described in section 3.  The data collection 
process is presented in section 4, whilst section 5 provides the results of the empirical testing.  
The final section of the paper provides discussion and conclusion. 
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2. Prior research and regulatory framework 
2.1 Regulation of foreign takeovers 
Foreign investment in Australia is regulated by the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 
1975.  Under section 18 of the Act the Federal Treasurer can prohibit a foreign takeover or 
approve it subject to conditions where the acquisition is considered to be contrary to the 
national interest.
3
  Interestingly, the Act does not provide a definition of what is meant by the 
term national interest.
4
  Under the operation of the Act foreigners must currently obtain 
approval from the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) of plans to acquire individually 
more than 15% of an Australian company worth equal to or more than $219 million.
5
 
 
2.2 Prior research 
Research across many countries documents that target shareholders earn significant positive 
abnormal returns around takeover announcements.  For instance, Bauguess, Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Zutter (2009) report in the US target abnormal returns of 22% over the 
three day event window centred on the takeover announcement.  Similar positive target 
shareholder abnormal returns have also been reported in Australia (e.g., Maheswaran and 
Pinder, 2005) and the UK (e.g., Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008).  Studies however, 
investigating the impact of the domicile of the bidder on target shareholder wealth are 
restricted to the United States.  Evidence from the US indicates that target shareholders of US 
                                                 
3
 The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act can be accessed at the following website: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/faata1975355/ 
4
 The lack of consistency in the application of what is in the ‘national interest’ has received recent criticism in 
the financial press.  See for example, Firth (2009) and Kirchner, (2009). 
5
 This threshold was increased from $100 million in September 2009. 
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domiciled targets (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Shaked, Michel and McClain, 1991 and 
Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos, 1992) acquired by an overseas bidder earn higher 
abnormal returns than shareholders of targets acquired by a domestic US bidder.  At present 
no research has compared Australian target firm abnormal returns across domestic and 
foreign bids. 
 
Related research has examined the short and long run returns to acquiring firms that make 
overseas acquisitions.   Findings from the UK (Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes, 2005) and US 
(Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) indicate that acquiring firms earn significantly lower 
returns around a takeover announcement when they bid for a foreign firm compared to a 
takeover offer for a domestic firm.  Similarly, acquirers of a foreign target have significantly 
lower long run post-acquisition performance than bidders that acquire a domestic target (Aw 
and Chaterjee, 2004; Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes, 2005 and Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005).  Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2004) find foreign direct investment is driven by low-cost 
financial capital being available to firms in the source country.  In contrast the valuation of 
assets in the host country is not related to the level of foreign direct investment.  A 
combination of the findings above suggests that bidders access lower cost capital to overpay 
for foreign acquisitions. 
  
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) discuss that one motivation for a bidder to acquire an overseas 
firm is to obtain access to technologies.  It is argued that R&D often acts as a barrier to entry 
and it is often inefficient to transfer technologies across borders.  Consistent with their 
expectation they find R&D intensity is higher for targets of overseas bidders.  In contrast, the 
results in Chen and Su (1997) show a negative relationship between R&D intensity and the 
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likelihood a firm will be subject to a takeover by a foreign firm.  Harris and Ravenscraft 
(1991) also find that R&D intensity is positively related to target firm abnormal returns 
around the takeover announcement.  This relationship does not differ however between 
domestic and foreign targets. 
 
Movements in the exchange rate are also expected to influence the frequency of takeover bids 
by foreign firms (Froot and Stein, 1991).  When the domestic currency is relatively weak this 
lowers the cost of an acquisition for a foreign firm and makes it more affordable for them to 
undertake a takeover.  The results in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) show that target 
shareholder abnormal returns in acquisitions by foreign bidders are significantly higher when 
the domestic currency is weaker. 
 
Chen and Su (1997) argue that as the search costs are larger when a firm makes a cross-
border acquisition it is expected that target firms acquired by overseas bidders will be larger 
in size.  Further, foreign acquirers will shy away from smaller firms as there is typically 
greater uncertainty surrounding their future prospects.  Consistent with their predictions they 
find that targets acquired by foreign firms are of a larger size than targets acquired by 
domestic firms. 
 
3. Research method 
To determine if the characteristics of target firms subject to a takeover bid from a foreign 
firm differ to those subject to a takeover from an Australian entity the following logit 
regression model is estimated: 
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OVERSEASi = i + 1FCFi + 2SALESGRi + 3DIROWNi + 4COMPBIDi + 5SIZEi + 
6LEVi + 7MKTBKi + 8ROEi + 9TOEHOLDi + 10FRIENDLYi + 11RESOURCEi 
12RESEARCHi + 13EXCHRATEi  + YEAR + i      (1) 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable denoting takeovers where the bidding firm is 
located outside Australia.   The results in Chen and Su (1997) predict that foreign bids will be 
for target firms of larger size.  Target firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of 
target market capitalisation three months prior to the takeover announcement (SIZE).  Harris 
and Ravenscraft (1991) argue that foreign acquirers may make a cross-border takeover offer 
to obtain access to the research and technology of the target firm.  Target firm research 
intensity is measured for the financial year prior to the takeover announcement as capitalised 
research and development divided by total assets (RESEARCH).  It is predicted this variable 
will have a positive coefficient.    We also examine if Australian firms are more likely to be a 
target of an overseas takeover attempt during periods of a relatively weak Australian dollar.  
Similar to the approach in Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) we take the average exchange rate 
over our sample period and subtract from this amount the average exchange rate in the year 
of the takeover (EXCHRATE).  This amount is then divided by the average exchange rate 
over the sample period.  As a positive value of EXCHRATE indicates that the Australian 
dollar is relatively weak compared to its average over the sample period it is predicted to 
have a positive coefficient in the estimation of model (1).  For the purposes of the analysis the 
Reserve Bank of Australia’s trade-weighted index is used to measure changes in the value of 
the Australian dollar.
6
 
                                                 
6
 Historical data on the exchange rate between the Australian dollar and other major currencies (including the 
trade-weighted index) are available at the website of the Reserve Bank of Australia: 
http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics. 
9 
 
Much of the media attention on foreign acquisitions of Australian firms focuses on takeovers 
in the resources sector.  As an examination of whether takeovers for firms involved in the 
resources sector are more likely to originate from outside Australia we include a dummy 
variable coded as one if the target firm is involved in exploring or extracting natural 
resources (RESOURCES).  Firms are classified as resources or otherwise by reading the 
principal activities description in the directors’ report for the year prior to the takeover 
announcement.  If foreign firms prefer low-risk and profitable targets than it would be 
expected that firms subject to a takeover from overseas would have lower leverage and higher 
free cash flow, growth and performance.  Free cash flow (FCF) is calculated for the year 
prior to the takeover as cash flow from operations minus dividends plus proceeds from the 
sale of non-current assets minus purchases of non-current assets.  This measure is scaled by 
average assets to avoid heteroskedasticity.  Target firm growth and growth options are 
measured respectively using sales growth over the two years before the takeover 
announcement (SALESGR) and the target firm’s market-to-book ratio measured at the 
financial year-end before the takeover announcement (MKTBK).  Leverage is measured as the 
target firm debt-to-equity ratio (LEV) and performance as the target firm return on equity 
ratio (ROE).  Both these ratios are calculated for the financial year ending prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
 
Target firm ownership structure is controlled for by including the ownership of the target firm 
directors (DIROWN) and toehold stake of the bidding firm in the model (TOEHOLD).  To 
determine if there is an increased proportion of competing bids where there is a foreign 
bidder we include a dummy variable indicating takeovers where more than one bidder 
announces a simultaneous takeover for the target firm (COMPBID).  The final variable 
included in model (1) is a dummy variable indicating whether the initial recommendation of 
10 
 
the target firm is to accept the takeover offer (FRIENDLY).  Due to the potential that media 
will pay additional attention to a foreign bid it may be the case that a foreign acquirer will be 
more likely to get agreement from the target board prior to announcing the takeover.  As prior 
evidence (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 and Harford, 2005) indicates that mergers 
occur in waves year indicator variables are included in model (1) to control for year fixed 
effects. 
 
Studies from the US indicate that target shareholders earn greater abnormal returns when the 
bidding firm is located overseas.  To examine if this is also the case in Australia we estimate 
regression model (2).  This model employs OLS and the dependent variable is the target firm 
buy-hold abnormal return (BHAR) calculated from 60 days prior to the takeover 
announcement until 30 days after the announcement.  The main variable of interest in model 
(2) is a dummy variable denoting takeovers where the acquiring firm is domiciled outside 
Australia (OVERSEAS).  The other explanatory variables included in the model are identical 
to those used in model (2).  In addition however, we also include interaction variables 
between OVERSEAS and both the research intensity (RES*OSEAS) and exchange rate 
(EXCH*OSEAS) variables.  These interaction variables will test if the association between 
research and the exchange rate and abnormal returns is different for takeovers made by a 
foreign bidder.  Regression model (2) can be summarised as follows: 
 
BHARi = i + 1OVERSEASi + 2FCFi + 3SALESGRi + 4DIROWNi + 5COMPBIDi + 
6SIZEi + 7LEVi + 8MKTBKi + 9ROEi + 10TOEHOLDi + 11FRIENDLYi + 
12RESOURCEi + 13RESEARCHi + 14EXCHRATEi + 15RES*OSEASi + 
16EXCH*OSEASi + YEAR + i         (2) 
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From the results in Smith and Kim (1994) it is predicted that abnormal returns will be 
positively associated with target firm free cash flow.  Abnormal returns are also expected to 
be greater when there are multiple bidders.  The toehold interest of the bidder and the 
ownership of target firm directors act as controls for target firm ownership structure.  Stulz 
(1988) argues that a higher premium must be paid when the bidder is required to purchase 
shares from a greater number of outside target shareholders.  Consistent with this expectation 
Stulz, Walkling and Song (1990) find target abnormal returns are positively associated to 
target managerial ownership and negatively related to the acquiring firm toehold.  Bugeja and 
Walter (1995) find similar results for toehold in Australia.  The coefficients on sales growth, 
market-to-book, ROE and leverage will control respectively for any association between 
target firm growth, performance and risk and abnormal returns.  Year dummy variables are 
also included in model (2) to control for year fixed effects on target firm abnormal returns. 
 
Foreign domiciled firms are less likely to offer share consideration as Australian shareholders 
will find it more difficult to trade foreign stock.  As such we first estimate models (1) and (2) 
using only takeovers where cash is exclusively offered as payment.  Both models are then re-
estimated including all takeovers.  In this subsequent analysis payment method is controlled 
for in each of the models by adding a cash payment dummy variable (CASHPAYT) indicating 
takeovers where payment is exclusively cash.  It is expected from prior research both in 
Australia (Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinback and Walter, 2000 and Bugeja, 2005) and elsewhere 
(Wansley, Lane and Yang 1983; Huang and Walkling, 1987; Franks, Harris and Mayer 1988; 
Franks, Harris and Titman 1991; Masse, Hanrahan and Kushner, 1991 and Draper and 
Paudyal, 1999) that there will be positive relationship between target shareholder abnormal 
returns and cash consideration. 
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4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions database was used to identify 646 takeovers 
announced for ASX listed firms between 1997 and 2008.  For each takeover the statutory 
documents lodged by the bidding firm with the ASX (available on Connect 4) were examined 
to determine the domicile of the ultimate bidder.
7
  Each bidder was thus categorised as either 
being an Australian or foreign entity.  The principal activities of each target firm were 
identified from the target firm annual report for the year before the takeover announcement 
sourced from the Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis Database.  Each target was then classified as 
being an industrial or resources entity.  It was necessary to delete 83 takeovers due to 
insufficient data to estimate the regression models.   The final sample thus comprises 563 
takeovers.   The temporal distribution of the sample is shown in Table 1 partitioned into 
Australian and foreign bidders and then further separated into resources and industrial targets. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The number of takeovers is fairly stable over the sample period, with the largest number of 
takeovers announced in 2006.  The proportion of takeovers where the bidder is located 
overseas ranges from 19% in 2005 to 42% in 1997.  Across the entire sample period the 
percentage of takeovers with a foreign bidder is approximately 25%.  Foreign bidders are 
more likely to make a takeover offer for a firm involved in resource related activities with 
just fewer than 40% of foreign takeovers for a resource target compared to 26% for domestic 
bidders.  This breakdown between the target industry sector for foreign bidders however 
                                                 
7
 For example, if a bidder is an Australian private company but is a subsidiary of a publicly listed firm outside 
Australia the takeover was classified as being made by a foreign bidder. 
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varies greatly across the sample period.  For instance in 2002 86% of foreign takeovers are 
for industrial targets compared to just 23% in 2008. 
 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the location of foreign bidders by year and industry.  The 
four most common locations of overseas bidders are respectively the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada and South Africa.  It is interesting to note the US bidders are more likely 
to target Australian industrial firms (79%), whilst UK (58%) and Canadian (56%) bidders 
more frequently make takeovers for targets in the resources sector. 
 
Statutory takeover documents lodged with the ASX by the bidder and target were used to 
collect information on: consideration type, bidding firm toehold, the recommendation of the 
target firm board and target director ownership.  Financial information was collected by 
downloading the target firm financial reports from the Aspect Huntley FinAnalysis database 
and then hand collecting the respective financial statement items.  Share price information 
needed to calculate BHARs, market capitalisation and the market-to-book ratio was sourced 
from the Core Research Database administered by the Securities Industry Research Centre of 
Asia-Pacific (i.e., SIRCA).  BHARs are calculated by subtracting the return on the All 
Ordinaries Accumulation Index from the target firm return.  Brown and Warner (1985) 
indicate that the power of this zero-one model to identify abnormal returns is similar to the 
standard market model.   
 
Panel A of Table 3 presents summary information on target shareholder abnormal returns.  
The results indicate that when payment form is ignored target shareholder abnormal returns 
14 
 
are on average 35% and the magnitude of the returns do not differ significantly across bidder 
location.  In contrast, when only cash takeovers are considered returns are 40% for foreign 
bids and 27% for takeovers from Australian bidders with the difference being statistically 
significant.  The comparison of abnormal returns across the bidder domicile for non-cash 
payment forms is insignificant.  This is not surprising however as the vast majority (86%) of 
foreign bidders offer cash. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE  
 
A comparison of target firm and deal characteristics across bidder types is provided 
respectively in Panels B and C of Table 3.  The findings indicate there is a significant 
difference in target firm size across bidder domicile with targets of foreign bidders 
significantly larger than for Australian bidders.  In comparison to takeovers made by their 
domestic counterparts targets of foreign bidders have lower director ownership and lower 
leverage.  The lower level of director ownership potentially reflects the greater size of targets 
subject to a foreign takeover.  As expected, the use of cash payment by foreign acquirers is 
significantly higher than by Australian bidders.  Foreign takeovers are significantly more 
likely to be a friendly takeover and involve competing bidders.  The univariate results do not 
indicate any significant difference in research intensity or the industry of the target between 
domestic and foreign acquisitions.  The results also show that there is no statistical difference 
in the success rate of foreign and domestic takeovers. 
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Table 4 presents average target firm abnormal returns separated by the domicile of the bidder.  
The average target shareholder return for takeovers from the USA, UK, Canada and South 
Africa are respectively: 39%, 26%, 22% and 46%.  A t-test (not tabulated) comparing the 
abnormal returns across these four locations indicated no statistically significant difference.
8
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE  
 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the variables included in the 
regression models are presented in Table 5.  The Spearman correlation indicates that target 
firm BHARs are significantly higher in takeovers by an overseas acquirer.  Additionally the 
Spearman correlation between target firm abnormal returns and target firm free cash flow is 
positive and significant.  As expected from prior studies the use of cash payment is associated 
with higher abnormal returns.  Overseas takeovers are positively correlated with: competing 
bids, target firm size, friendly takeovers, the target firm market-to-book ratio, the use of cash 
payment and targets in the resources sector.  Target board ownership is negatively correlated 
with foreign takeovers.  No individual correlation coefficients in Table 3 are above 0.8 
suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem in the estimation of the 
regression models.
9
  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE  
                                                 
8
 A comparison of returns across other locations was not conducted due to the low number of observations for 
the other countries. 
9
 Gujarati (1995), p. 335. 
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5. Results 
The results of estimating model (1) comparing the characteristics of targets subject to a 
takeover from foreign entities with those from Australian bidders is given in Table 6.  The 
results are presented for both cash takeovers only (column 1) and using the entire sample 
(column 2).  As predicted and confirming the results in Chen and Su (1997) larger target 
firms are more likely to be subject to an overseas takeover.  The results also indicate that 
foreign firms prefer to make takeover offers for target firms with lower risk as highlighted by 
the significant negative coefficient on target firm leverage.  Inconsistent with Harris and 
Ravenscraft (1991) the results indicate that research intensiveness is not related to the 
probability that a takeover offer will originate from overseas.  Also inconsistent with 
predictions, the relative strength of the Australian dollar is insignificant in explaining the 
likelihood a takeover will be made by a foreign firm.  This finding supports the results in 
Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2004) that a relatively cheap local asset does not drive foreign 
direct investment.  The results also show that foreign takeovers are significantly more likely 
when the target firm is involved in the resources sector.  An accept recommendation of the 
target board is positively associated with the probability of a foreign takeover suggesting that 
foreign acquirers are more likely to negotiate the deal with the target firm board.  Target 
directors ownership is significantly lower in foreign takeover offers possibly reflecting that 
target firms subject to overseas bids are of a larger size.  Foreign bids are also associated with 
a lower toehold interest reflecting the statutory limitation on foreign ownership without 
receiving approval of the FIRB.  Interestingly, target firm growth and performance do not 
discriminate between a foreign and domestic takeover offer.
10
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 Significant coefficients on the year indicator variables were reported for 2001 (negative) and 2007 (positive) 
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating model (2) for respectively the cash payment sample 
(column 1) and the full sample (column 2).  The results show that when the sample is 
restricted to cash payment target shareholders receive significantly higher returns when the 
bidder is listed overseas.  This finding is similar to that reported in the US (Harris and 
Ravenscraft, 1991; Shaked, Michel and McClain, 1991 and Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and 
Travlos 1992).   The interaction variable between a foreign bidder and research intensiveness 
is significantly positive.  This result indicates that foreign acquirers will pay a higher 
premium for research intensive target firms than a domestic bidder.  In contrast, the 
interaction variable between a foreign bidder and the exchange rate is insignificant. 
 
Target shareholder abnormal returns are significantly higher for targets involved in the 
resources sector.
11
  Consistent with greater possible post-takeover performance improvements 
target firm return on equity is negatively related to target firm abnormal returns for the cash 
payment sample.  Similar to the results in Smith and Kim (1994) target firm free cash flow is 
positively related to abnormal returns in the cash payment sub-sample.  The coefficient on the 
exchange rate variable is negative and significant indicating that in periods when the 
Australian dollar is relatively weak there is a reduction in takeover premiums.  This finding 
suggests that takeover premiums respond to changes in general economic conditions and is 
consistent with the result in Finn and Hodgson (2005) that takeover activity is driven by 
economic fundamentals.  When the full sample is used target abnormal returns are 
                                                 
11
 In additional analysis an interaction variable between RESOURCE and OVERSEAS was included to assess if 
the significant result for resource sector targets differs by the domicile of the bidder.  The interaction term was 
insignificant and the other results remained unchanged. 
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significantly higher in competing bids, when cash payment if offered and when the target 
firm has lower leverage.  The recommendation of target firm directors, target board 
ownership, the toehold interest of the bidder and target firm size are insignificant in 
explaining target shareholder returns. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Additional tests 
Foreign takeovers and takeover competition and outcome 
As foreign takeovers of Australian entities frequently attract heightened media attention it is 
interesting to examine if foreign takeovers are associated with a greater level of takeover 
competition.  Furthermore, given the greater attention on these takeovers it is possible the rate 
of success of foreign takeovers differs to those made by local Australian bidders.  To 
investigate these issues the following three logit regression models are estimated: 
 
COMPBIDi = i + 1OVERSEASi  + 2BHARi + 3FCFi + 4SALESGRi + 5DIROWNi + 
6SIZEi + 7LEVi + 8MKTBKi + 9ROEi + 10TOEHOLDi + 11FRIENDLYi + 
12RESOURCEi + 13RESEARCHi  + i       (3) 
 
REVISIONi = i + 1OVERSEASi  + 2BHARi + 3FCFi + 4SALESGRi + 5DIROWNi +  
6COMPBIDi  + 7SIZEi + 8LEVi + 9MKTBKi + 10ROEi + 11TOEHOLDi + 
12FRIENDLYi + 13RESOURCEi + 14RESEARCHi  + i     (4) 
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OUTCOMEi = i + 1OVERSEASi  + 2BHARi + 3FCFi + 4SALESGRi + 5DIROWNi +  
6COMPBIDi  + 7SIZEi + 8LEVi + 9MKTBKi + 10ROEi + 11TOEHOLDi + 
12FRIENDLYi + 13RESOURCEi + 14RESEARCHi  + 15REVISIONi + i  (5) 
 
These three models respectively examine if foreign takeovers are associated with the 
frequency of competing takeovers (model 3), the probability of a revision in offer price 
(model 4) and the likelihood of a successful takeover (model 5).  The dependent variable in 
model four is a binary variable coded as one if the bidder revises their offer price during the 
takeover period.  All other variables are as defined previously. 
 
The results of estimating the three regression models are presented in Table 8 for cash 
takeovers.  The findings indicate that the domicile of the bidder is not associated with 
takeover competition, the probability of a revision in offer price or takeover outcome.  The 
results for the control variables indicate that higher target free cash flow increases the 
likelihood of multiple bidders and a revision in the offer price.  In contrast, higher target 
director ownership reduces the probability of takeover competition or an increased offer 
price.  As would be expected a higher toehold increases the likelihood of takeover success 
and reduces the probability that another bidder will announce a competing bid.  An accept 
recommendation of the target firm board reduces the chance that the bidder will revise the 
offer price but increases the probability that the takeover will succeed.  A competing bid is 
positively associated with the frequency of a revision in offer price but reduces the likelihood 
of takeover success.  An increase in the offer price raises the probability the takeover will 
succeed.  Interestingly, the abnormal return around the announcement of the takeover is not 
20 
 
associated with takeover competition, revisions in offer price or takeover outcome.
12
    The 
results for the takeover outcome model are consistent with Henry (2004) except that this 
study does not find a significant positive coefficient on takeover premium. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
 
FIRB intervention 
The preceding analysis indicated that there was no difference in the rate of takeover success 
between foreign and domestic bids.  For those foreign bids that failed an examination of 
announcements made to the ASX was conducted to determine if this was due to the 
intervention of the FIRB.  Of the 49 foreign takeovers that failed only one was withdrawn 
following the intervention of the FIRB.  This was the takeover announced for Woodside 
Petroleum Limited by Royal Dutch Shell in November 2000.
13
 
 
Time to complete 
To examine if foreign takeovers take longer to complete than domestic takeovers the number 
of days from the takeover announcement until the closing of the bid was calculated for 
successful and unsuccessful takeovers.  In successful bids domestic takeovers were concluded 
on average in 107 days compared to 130 days for foreign bids.  For unsuccessful takeovers 
                                                 
12
 The three models were also estimated for the entire sample of takeovers irrespective of payment method with 
the inclusion of the indicator variable denoting takeovers where cash was offered as payment.  The conclusions 
drawn from each of the regressions models remained unchanged.  The cash payment dummy was significant and 
positively associated with multiple bidders, offer price revisions and a successful takeover. 
13
 It is obviously not possible to observe takeovers that are not announced because of the likelihood the 
acquisition would be banned by the FIRB. 
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the length of time until the lapse of the bid was 98 days for Australian bids and 106 days for 
foreign bids.  The differences in time to complete between domestic and foreign bids were 
statistically insignificant for both successful and unsuccessful takeovers. 
 
Exchange rate 
It had been predicted that foreign takeovers would be more likely during periods of relative 
weakness in the Australian dollar.  The results however, indicate that the exchange rate is not 
associated with the likelihood of a foreign bid, nor is it related to takeover premiums.  As a 
sensitivity test the exchange rate employed in the testing of models (1) and (2) was 
respecified using alternatively the Australian dollar exchange rate against the United States 
dollar and the Great Britain pound.  Using these alternative exchange rate measures the 
exchange rate variable in models (1) and (2) and the exchange rate interaction term in model 
(2) remained insignificant.  The interpretations on the other variables were unchanged. 
 
Bidding firm abnormal returns 
Table 9 presents data on bidding firm abnormal returns for two event windows around the 
takeover announcement: one day before until one day after and ten days before until ten days 
after.  Share prices for Australian bidders are sourced from the Core Research Database, 
whilst share prices for overseas bidders are sourced from publicly available databases 
accessible through the internet.  Panel A of the table presents results for all takeovers whilst 
Panel B provides the findings only for takeovers that offer exclusively cash payment.  The 
results are similar across both panels with bidding firm abnormal returns not significantly 
different from zero other than for Australian bidders over the longer event window.  A 
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comparison of returns earned by bidders for ASX targets indicates that the returns received 
by domestic and foreign bidders are not statistically different from each other.
14
 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
6. Conclusions 
Foreign acquisitions of Australian corporations are an issue that often attracts heightened 
media and political attention and debate.  Prior to this study there was no evidence as to the 
type of Australian firms that were more likely to attract a foreign takeover offer.  The 
findings of this study indicate that Australian firms subject to a foreign takeover are typically 
larger, have lower leverage and are operating in the resources sector.  Foreign takeovers are 
also more frequently friendly acquisitions.  Fluctuations in the Australian dollar exchange 
rate and target firm research intensiveness are not related to the likelihood of a foreign 
takeover. 
 
This study also investigated differences in target shareholder abnormal returns between 
Australian and overseas bidders.  Consistent with previous studies from the US, target 
shareholders earn significantly higher abnormal returns when the bidder is located outside 
Australia.  This result indicates that political concerns over the selling of Australia assets to 
foreigners cannot be justified in regards to the price that is paid.  Furthermore, the findings 
                                                 
14
 The sample size for Australian bidders is lower than the number of takeovers as some domestic bidders are 
not listed.  Eight of the foreign bidders were not listed whilst share prices could not be obtained for a further 28 
firms. 
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show that overseas acquirers pay an additional premium for research intensive targets in 
comparison to Australian bidders.  In contrast, target abnormal returns of overseas bidders are 
not explained by exchange rate fluctuations.  The results also signify that target firms in the 
resources sector earn higher abnormal returns.  As an extension of this study it would be 
interesting for future research to examine the performance of Australian entities acquiring 
targets outside Australia. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of takeover offers across Australian and foreign bidders 
This table shows the number of takeovers for ASX listed firms between 1997 and 2008.  
Each takeover is classified according to whether the ultimate bidder is domiciled within 
or outside Australia and whether the target firm has activities in the resources sector. 
 Aust bidder 
resources 
target 
Aust bidder 
industrial 
target 
Sub-total 
 
O/seas bidder 
resources 
target 
O/seas bidder 
industrial 
target 
Sub-total 
 
Total 
1997 9 16 25 3 15 18 43 
 36.00% 64.00% 58.14% 16.67% 83.33% 41.86%  
1998 12 22 34 4 6 10 44 
 35.29% 64.71% 77.27% 40.00% 60.00% 22.73%  
1999 9 26 35 3 6 9 44 
 25.71% 74.29% 79.55% 33.33% 66.67% 20.45%  
2000 13 30 43 9 4 13 56 
 30.23% 69.77% 76.79% 69.23% 30.77% 23.21%  
2001 8 30 38 2 8 10 48 
 21.05% 78.95% 79.17% 20.00% 80.00% 20.83%  
2002 4 23 27 1 6 7 34 
 14.81% 85.19% 79.41% 14.29% 85.71% 20.59%  
2003 3 31 34 2 8 10 44 
 8.82% 91.18% 77.27% 20.00% 80.00% 22.73%  
2004 5 25 30 2 6 8 38 
 16.67% 83.33% 78.95% 25.00% 75.00% 21.05%  
2005 5 25 30 5 2 7 37 
 16.67% 83.33% 81.08% 71.43% 28.57% 18.92%  
2006 16 37 53 4 10 14 67 
 30.19% 69.81% 79.10% 28.57% 71.43% 20.90%  
2007 16 25 41 10 11 21 62 
 39.02% 60.98% 66.13% 47.62% 52.38% 33.87%  
2008 12 21 33 10 3 13 46 
 36.36% 63.64% 71.74% 76.92% 23.08% 28.26%  
Total 112 311 423 55 85 140 563 
 26.48% 73.52% 75.13% 39.29% 60.71% 24.87%  
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Table 2 
Domicile of foreign bidders 
This table presents information across the sample period on the domicile of foreign bidders for ASX listed targets classified into resources (R) and industrial (I) targets. 
Year 97 97 98 98 99 99 00 00 01 01 02 02 03 03 04 04 05 05 06 06 07 07 08 08 Total 
 
Total 
Sector R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I 
 Austria 
    
1 
                   
1 0 1 
Brazil 
 
1 
                      
0 1 1 
Canada 3 2 
       
1 1 2 
    
1 
 
2 
 
1 2 1 
 
9 7 16 
China 
                      
2 
 
2 0 2 
Denmark 
                   
1 
    
0 1 1 
France 
 
1 
       
1 
          
1 
   
1 2 3 
Germany 
             
1 
          
0 1 1 
Greece 
      
1 
                 
1 0 1 
Hong Kong 
             
2 
 
1 
      
2 
 
2 3 5 
Indonesia 
            
1 
       
1 
  
1 2 1 3 
Italy 
      
1 1 
     
2 
          
1 3 4 
Japan 
      
1 
                 
1 0 1 
Malaysia 
           
1 
       
1 
    
0 2 2 
Mexico 
                   
1 
    
0 1 1 
Netherlands 
     
1 1 
    
1 
         
1 
  
1 3 4 
New Zealand 
 
1 
             
1 
       
1 0 3 3 
Norway 
         
1 
              
0 1 1 
Philippines 
       
1 
       
1 
        
0 2 2 
Poland 
                   
1 
    
0 1 1 
Russia 
                     
1 
  
0 1 1 
Saudi Arabia 
                      
1 
 
1 0 1 
Singapore 
         
1 
   
1 
 
2 
   
1 
 
2 
  
0 7 7 
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Table 2 
Domicile of foreign bidders - continued 
Year 97 97 98 98 99 99 00 00 01 01 02 02 03 03 04 04 05 05 06 06 07 07 08 08 Total 
 
Total 
Sector R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I R I 
 South Africa 
 
4 
 
2 1 
 
2 
 
1 
   
1 
 
1 1 
   
1 
    
6 8 14 
Spain 
  
1 
              
1 
      
1 1 2 
Sweden 
                   
1 
    
0 1 1 
Switzerland 
                    
3 
 
1 
 
4 0 4 
UK 
 
1 2 1 1 3 1 1 
 
1 
   
1 1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
3 2 2 1 15 11 26 
Ukraine 
                    
1 
   
1 0 1 
USA 
 
5 1 3 
 
2 2 1 1 3 
 
2 
 
1 
  
1 1 
 
3 
 
2 1 
 
6 23 29 
Vietnam 
                     
1 
  
0 1 1 
Total 3 15 4 6 3 6 9 4 2 8 1 6 2 8 2 6 5 2 4 10 10 11 10 3 55 85 140 
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Table 3 
Takeover premiums and target firm and deal characteristics by bidder type 
This table presents means for takeover premiums, target firm characteristics and deal characteristics partitioned 
by the domicile of the bidder.  Takeover premiums are calculated as the BHAR from 60 days prior to the 
takeover announcement until 30 days after.  Target firm characteristics include: free cash flow (FCF) sales 
growth in the two years prior to the takeover (SALESGR), target director ownership (DIROWN), capitalised 
research as a percentage of total assets (RESEARCH), the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (SIZE), 
debt-to-equity ratio (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MKTBK) return on equity ratio (ROE) and a dummy variable 
indicating if the target firm is in the resources sector (RESOURCE).  Deal characteristics are: the ownership 
interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover (TOEHOLD), a measure of 
fluctuations in the Australian dollar exchange rate (EXCHRATE) and dummy variables indicating takeovers 
where: the target board recommends takeover acceptance (FRIENDLY), a competing takeover exists 
(COMPBID) and the consideration offered is exclusively cash (CASHPAYT).  The table also reports the 
percentage of takeovers with a successful outcome (OUTCOME).  A univariate test of differences in means 
between foreign and Australian bids is presented.  For continuous/(binary) variables a t-test/(χ2-test) is used to 
assess if the difference in means is statistically significant. 
 Australian 
bidders 
Foreign  
bidders 
Overall Test of difference 
Australian vs 
Foreign 
Panel A: Takeover 
premiums 
    
All takeovers 35.23 35.07 35.19 0.01 
Cash payment only  27.01 40.04 31.41 -2.83*** 
Other payment forms 51.57 5.28 41.68 1.51 
Panel B: Target 
firm characteristics 
    
FCF -9.64 -7.40 -9.08 -0.09 
SALESGR 40.36 31.60 38.19 0.58 
DIROWN 12.05 6.95 10.79 3.61*** 
RESEARCH 0.75 1.04 0.83 -0.49 
SIZE 17.91 18.85 18.14 -5.24*** 
LEV 1.15 0.83 1.07 2.97*** 
MKTBK 3.50 2.28 3.20 1.43 
ROE -1.25 -0.01 -0.93 -1.09 
RESOURCE 29.56 32.14 29.55 -0.58 
Panel C: Deal 
characteristics 
    
TOEHOLD 20.17 17.13 19.41 1.14 
FRIENDLY 54.37 63.57 56.67 -1.90* 
COMPBID 21.04 30.71 23.45 -2.34** 
EXCHRATE -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 1.14 
CASHPAYT 55.79 85.71 63.23 -6.36*** 
OUTCOME 65.48 65.71 65.54 -0.05 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4 
Takeover premiums by domicile of bidders 
This table reports takeover premiums by the domicile of the bidder.  Takeover premiums are calculated as the 
BHAR from 60 days prior to the takeover announcement until 30 days after. 
Country No of 
takeovers 
Premium Country No of 
takeovers 
Premium 
Austria 1 54.84% New 
Zealand 
3 13.32% 
Brazil 1 29.86% Norway 1 37.25% 
Canada 16 21.63% Philippines 2 60.94% 
China 2 54.67% Poland 1 23.26% 
Denmark 1 35.29% Russia 1 109.60% 
France 3 32.02% Saudi 
Arabia 
1 31.23% 
Germany 1 21.92% Singapore 7 43.56% 
Greece 1 33.11% South 
Africa 
14 46.40% 
Hong Kong 5 19.92% Spain 2 5.37% 
Indonesia 3 71.65% Sweden 1 34.79% 
Italy 4 48.78% Switzerland 4 36.60% 
Japan 1 103.09% UK 26 25.81% 
Malaysia 2 40.20% Ukraine 1 45.89% 
Mexico 1 29.63% USA 29 38.81% 
Netherlands 4 22.00% Vietnam 1 10.01% 
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Table 5 
Correlation between dependent and independent variables 
Pearson correlations are above the diagonal and Spearman correlations are below 
This table presents correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variables in the two regression models.  BHARs are calculated from 60 days prior to the 
takeover announcement until 30 days after (BHAR).  Target firm characteristics include: free cash flow (FCF) sales growth in the two years prior to the takeover (SALESGR), 
target director ownership (DIROWN), capitalised research as a percentage of total assets (RESEARCH), the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (SIZE), debt-to-equity 
ratio (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MKTBK) return on equity ratio (ROE) and a dummy variable indicating if the target firm is in the resources sector (RESOURCE).  Deal 
characteristics are the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover (TOEHOLD), a measure of fluctuations in the Australian dollar 
exchange rate (EXCHRATE) and dummy variables indicating takeovers where: the target board recommends takeover acceptance (FRIENDLY), whether a competing 
takeover exists (COMPBID) and if the consideration offered is exclusively cash (CASHPAYT).  Interaction variables between OVERSEAS and RESEARCH (RES*OSEAS) 
and OVERSEAS and EXCHRATE (EXCH*OSEAS) are included. 
 BHAR OVERSEAS FCF SALESGR DIROWN COMPBID SIZE LEV 
BHAR 1 0.007 0.009 -0.010 -0.030 0.002 -0.013 -0.014 
OVERSEAS 0.164*** 1 0.027 -0.034 -0.129*** 0.099** 0.206*** 0.066 
FCF 0.197*** 0.070* 1 -0.069 -0.003 0.018 0.236*** -0.003 
SALESGR -0.030 0.073* 0.068 1 -0.033 -0.033 -0.011 -0.004 
DIROWN 0.037 -0.120*** -0.042 0.069* 1 -0.171*** -0.253*** 0.076* 
COMPBID 0.120*** 0.099** 0.077* -0.026 -0.182*** 1 0.076* -0.027 
SIZE 0.088** 0.215*** 0.298*** 0.069* -0.340*** 0.084** 1 -0.041 
LEV 0.027 -0.076* 0.221*** -0.048 -0.006 0.034 0.102*** 1 
MKTBK -0.036 0.079* -0.042 0.061 -0.028 -0.001 0.298*** 0.135*** 
ROE -0.027 0.032 0.384*** 0.040 -0.070* -0.079* 0.367*** 0.081* 
TOEHOLD 0.026 -0.048 0.070* -0.005 -0.004 -0.141*** -0.059 0.155*** 
FRIENDLY 0.055 0.080* 0.044 0.043 0.157*** -0.091** 0.013 0.073* 
RESOURCE 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.046 -0.070* -0.078* 0.063 0.062 -0.246*** 
RESEARCH -0.013 0.050 -0.011 0.027 0.087** 0.024 -0.042 0.067 
EXCHRATE 0.062 -0.052 0.021 -0.102** -0.166*** 0.049 0.157*** -0.048 
CASHPAYT 0.220*** 0.268*** 0.192*** 0.019 0.003 0.074* 0.017 0.093* 
OSEAS*RES 0.057 0.325*** 0.012 0.100*** 0.038 0.037 0.042 -0.018 
OSEAS*EXCH 0.031 -0.155*** 0.102** -0.021 -0.068 -0.021 -0.046 -0.072* 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level  
34 
 
Table 5 - continued 
 
MKTBK ROE 
TOE 
HOLD 
FRIENDL
Y 
 
RESOURC
E 
RESEAR
CH 
EXCH 
RATE 
CASH 
PAYT 
OSEAS* 
RES 
OSEAS* 
EXCH 
BHAR -0.003 0.005 -0.027 0.041 0.091** 0.010 -0.052 -0.024 0.032 0.006 
OVERSEAS 0.125*** 0.024 -0.037 0.080* 0.121*** 0.025 -0.048 0.268*** 0.139*** -0.180*** 
FCF 0.052 0.010 0.052 0.025 -0.013 -0.001 -0.007 0.135*** 0.012 0.067 
SALESGR -0.004 -0.014 0.002 -0.076* -0.041 -0.010 -0.006 -0.039 -0.006 0.003 
DIROWN 0.014 -0.080* 0.030 0.183*** -0.159*** 0.074* -0.111*** 0.052 0.067 0.007 
COMPBID 0.072* 0.021 -0.119*** -0.091** 0.063 -0.025 0.053 0.074* 0.013 -0.037 
SIZE 0.072* 0.065 -0.021 0.023 0.072* -0.049 -0.128*** -0.009 -0.021 -0.079* 
LEV 0.568*** -0.082* -0.020 -0.043 -0.028 -0.009 -0.057 -0.058 -0.005 -0.122*** 
MKTBK 1 -0.023 -0.037 0.016 0.008 -0.013 -0.101** 0.005 -0.007 -0.207*** 
ROE 0.094** 1 0.022 -0.033 -0.060 0.006 0.060 0.061 0.004 -0.004 
TOEHOLD -0.037 0.033 1 0.079* -0.080* -0.047 0.062 0.156*** -0.016 -0.058 
FRIENDLY 0.002 0.072* 0.152*** 1 -0.115*** 0.005 -0.044 0.024 0.049 -0.012 
RESOURCE 0.220*** -0.143*** -0.099** -0.115*** 1 -0.072* -0.110*** -0.158*** -0.051 -0.101** 
RESEARCH -0.067 0.039 -0.083** 0.063 -0.142*** 1 0.014 0.068 0.630*** 0.040 
EXCHRATE -0.282*** -0.065 0.024 0.045 -0.124*** 0.024 1 0.026 0.004 0.479*** 
CASHPAYT -0.122*** 0.067 0.249*** 0.024 -0.158*** 0.078* 0.035 1 0.048 -0.080* 
OSEASRES -0.052 0.048 -0.045 0.065 -0.059 0.535*** 0.009 0.081* 1 0.044 
OSASEXCH -0.120*** -0.003 -0.093** -0.017 -0.064 0.016 0.424*** -0.067 -0.007 1 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6 
Logit model testing for differences in target firm characteristics between foreign bidders and 
Australian bidders 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable denoting takeovers where the bidder is domiciled outside 
Australia. The independent variables are target firm: free cash flow (FCF), sales growth in the two years prior to 
the takeover (SALESGR), director ownership (DIROWN) capitalised research as a percentage of total assets 
(RESEARCH), size measured using the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (SIZE), debt-to-equity ratio 
(LEV), market-to-book ratio (MKTBK) return on equity ratio (ROE) and a dummy variable indicating if the 
target firm is in the resources sector (RESOURCE).  The model also includes dummy variables indicating: a 
competing takeover exists for the target firm (COMPBID), whether the consideration offered is entirely cash 
(CASHPAYT) and whether the initial recommendation of the target board is acceptance of the takeover 
(FRIENDLY).  The model also includes the relative value of the Australian dollar over the sample period 
(EXCHRATE) and the ownership interest of the bidder at the time the takeover is announced (TOEHOLD).  
Year indicator variables are also included in the model but results are not reported. 
 Cash offers 
(1) 
All payment methods 
(2) 
Intercept 
 
-9.8808 
(-0.01) 
-11.4030 
(-0.01) 
FCF 
 
0.2478 
(0.43) 
-0.3448 
(-0.72) 
SALESGR 
 
-0.0058 
(-0.29) 
-0.0069 
(-0.37) 
DIROWN 
 
-1.7463 
(-1.90)* 
-1.7047 
(-1.97)* 
COMPBID 
 
0.3506 
(1.12) 
0.03354 
(1.23) 
SIZE 
 
0.3265 
(3.79)*** 
0.3171 
(4.44)*** 
LEV 
 
-0.1897 
(-1.69)* 
-0.0414 
(0.93) 
MKTBK 
 
0.0551 
(1.16) 
0.0224 
(1.04) 
ROE 
 
-0.0963 
(-0.84) 
-0.0040 
(-0.34) 
TOEHOLD 
 
-1.2349 
(-1.94)* 
-1.1165 
(-1.92)* 
FRIENDLY 
 
0.9395 
(3.26)*** 
0.7784 
(3.15)*** 
RESOURCE 0.9316 
(2.79)*** 
0.7606 
(2.89)*** 
RESEARCH 
 
1.2073 
(0.60) 
1.6355 
(0.86) 
EXCHRATE 
 
-0.4779 
(-0.53) 
-0.4196 
(-0.42) 
CASHPAYT 
 
- 1.9778 
(6.58)*** 
YEAR Yes Yes 
Observations 356 563 
% classified correctly 74.44 79.75 
McFadden R
2
 13.54 17.54 
Log-ratio 88.22*** 133.96*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7 
OLS regression test of differences in target shareholder abnormal returns between 
foreign bidders and Australian bidders 
The dependent variable is the target firm BHAR measured from 60 days prior to the takeover announcement 
until 30 days after.  The main test variable (OVERSEAS) denotes takeovers where the bidder is located outside 
Australia.  The other independent variables are target firm: free cash flow (FCF), sales growth in the two years 
prior to the takeover (SALESGR), director ownership (DIROWN) capitalised research as a percentage of total 
assets (RESEARCH), size measured using the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (SIZE), debt-to-equity 
ratio (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MKTBK) return on equity ratio (ROE) and a dummy variable indicating if the 
target firm is in the resources sector (RESOURCE).  The model also includes dummy variables indicating: a 
competing takeover exists for the target firm (COMPBID), whether the consideration offered is entirely cash 
(CASHPAYT) and whether the initial recommendation of the target board is acceptance of the takeover 
(FRIENDLY).  The model also includes the relative value of the Australian dollar over the sample period 
(EXCHRATE) and the ownership interest of the bidder at the time the takeover is announced (TOEHOLD).  
Interaction variables between OVERSEAS and RESEARCH (RES*OSEAS) and OVERSEAS and EXCHRATE 
(EXCH*OSEAS) are also included.  Year indicator variables are also included in the model but results are not 
reported. 
 Cash only 
(1) 
All payt types 
(2) 
Intercept 
 
0.4098 
(2.46)** 
0.1044 
(0.69) 
OVERSEAS 0.0826 
(1.77)* 
0.0181 
(0.46) 
FCF 
 
0.1943 
(2.59)*** 
0.1079 
(1.33) 
SALESGR 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.11) 
-0.0033 
(-1.29) 
DIROWN 0.0152 
(0.16) 
-0.01630 
(-0.17) 
COMPBID 
 
0.0326 
(0.77) 
0.0750 
(1.86)** 
SIZE 
 
-0.0034 
(-0.39) 
-0.0079 
(-0.10) 
LEV 
 
0.0001 
(0.10) 
-0.0049 
(-2.09)** 
MKTBK 
 
0.0001 
(0.94) 
0.0009 
(0.85) 
ROE 
 
-0.0203 
(-8.88)*** 
0.0014 
(0.49) 
TOEHOLD 
 
-0.0195 
(-0.86) 
-0.0202 
(-0.75) 
FRIENDLY 
 
0.0245 
(0.62) 
0.0485 
(1.32) 
RESOURCE 0.1157 
(2.37)** 
0.1489 
(3.52)*** 
RESEARCH 
 
-0.3206 
(-1.06) 
-0.3929 
(-1.15) 
EXCHRATE -2.5865 
(-3.28)*** 
-2.2071 
(-3.16)*** 
RES*OSEAS 0.4435 
(5.74)*** 
0.5300 
(4.81)*** 
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EXCH*OSEAS 0.0441 
(0.17) 
-0.1532 
(0.62) 
CASHPAYT 
 
- 0.1327 
(3.48)*** 
YEAR Yes Yes 
Observations 356 563 
Adjusted R
2
 10.02 7.31 
F-stat 2.46*** 2.58*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
38 
 
Table 8 
Logit model testing for differences in takeover characteristics between foreign bidders 
and Australian bidders 
This table presents the results of estimating three logit regression models.  In column (1) the dependent variable 
is an indicator variable denoting takeovers where there are competing bidders. In column (2) the dependent 
variable is an indicator variable denoting takeovers where the bidder revises the offer price.  In column (3) the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable denoting successful takeovers.  The main test variable (OVERSEAS) 
denotes takeovers where the bidder is located outside Australia. Other independent variables are target firm: free 
cash flow (FCF), sales growth in the two years prior to the takeover (SALESGR), director ownership (DIROWN) 
capitalised research as a percentage of total assets (RESEARCH), size measured using the natural logarithm of 
market capitalisation (SIZE), debt-to-equity ratio (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MKTBK) return on equity ratio 
(ROE) and a dummy variable indicating if the target firm is in the resources sector (RESOURCE).  Dummy 
variables in the model indicate: a competing takeover exists for the target firm (COMPBID), and whether the 
initial recommendation of the target board is acceptance of the takeover (FRIENDLY).  The models also include 
the ownership interest of the bidder at the time the takeover is announced (TOEHOLD) and the target firm 
BHAR measured from 60 days prior to the takeover announcement until 30 days after (BHAR). 
 Competing 
bidders 
(1) 
Offer revision 
 
(2) 
Outcome 
 
(3) 
Intercept 
 
-0.7114 
(-0.53) 
-1.3768 
(-1.12) 
-2.1649 
(-1.65) 
OVERSEAS 0.2101 
(0.72) 
-0.3231 
(-1.15) 
0.0055 
(0.02) 
BHAR 0.3166 
(0.87) 
0.3455 
(0.99) 
0.3872 
(0.92) 
FCF 
 
1.2045 
(1.81)* 
1.2910 
(2.08)** 
0.0408 
(0.07) 
SALESGR 
 
-0.0256 
(-0.68) 
0.0042 
(0.43) 
-0.0062 
(-0.62) 
DIROWN 
 
-3.7013 
(-2.96)*** 
-1.8727 
(-2.07)** 
0.3566 
(0.33) 
COMPBID 
 
- 0.5032 
(1.83)* 
-1.7075 
(-5.02)*** 
SIZE 
 
0.0210 
(0.29) 
0.0727 
(1.09) 
0.0741 
(1.03) 
LEV 
 
-0.0201 
(-0.63) 
0.0176 
(0.84) 
0.0826 
(0.76) 
MKTBK 
 
0.0013 
(0.58) 
0.0016 
(0.84) 
-0.0004 
(-0.79) 
ROE 
 
-0.8578 
(-2.23)** 
-0.0902 
(-0.48) 
-0.0732 
(-1.13) 
TOEHOLD 
 
-3.1579 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.3874 
(-0.86) 
3.8428 
(3.42)*** 
FRIENDLY 
 
-0.0363 
(-0.13) 
-0.9617 
(-3.84)*** 
2.2922 
(6.80)*** 
RESOURCE 0.2278 
(0.72) 
0.2411 
(0.81) 
-0.3576 
(-1.01) 
RESEARCH 
 
-1.5394 
(-0.59) 
1.3904 
(0.74) 
-0.6212 
(-0.27) 
39 
 
REVISION - - 0.9836 
(2.99)*** 
Observations 356 356 356 
% classified correctly 77.53 68.82 82.02 
McFadden R2 10.25 7.45 28.74 
Log-ratio 55.08*** 51.07*** 137.64*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 9 
Comparison of bidder announcement returns by domicile 
This table presents abnormal returns around the takeover announcement for firms bidding for 
Australian listed targets. A t-test of differences in means between foreign and Australian bids 
is presented.  A t-test of whether the abnormal returns are statistically different from zero is 
also presented. 
 Australian 
bidders 
 
Foreign  
bidders 
 
Test of difference 
Australian vs 
Foreign 
Panel A: All takeovers    
(-1,+1) 0.12 0.40 -0.21 
(-10,+10) -1.92** -0.02 -1.14 
Observations 315 104  
Panel B: Cash takeovers    
(-1,+1) 0.46 0.40 0.04 
(-10,+10) -1.63** 0.16 -1.07 
Observations 138 102  
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
